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THE  COMPENSATION  CONSTRAINT  AND  THE
SCOPE  OF  THE  TAKINGS CLAUSE
Thomas W. Merrill*
INTRODUCTION
The idea I wish to explore in this Essay is whether the established meth-
ods for determining just compensation can shed light on the meaning of
other issues that arise in litigation under the Takings Clause.  Specifically, is
it possible to “reverse engineer” the Takings Clause by reasoning from settled
understandings about how to determine just compensation in order to reach
certain conclusions about when the Clause applies, what interests in private
property are covered by the Clause, and what does it mean to take such
property?1
The proposed exercise is positive or descriptive in nature rather than
normative.  The hypothesis is that the ability to calculate just compensation,
using established valuation techniques, is a necessary condition for finding
that the Takings Clause applies.  That the compensation constraint is a neces-
sary condition for applying the Clause does not establish that it is a sufficient
condition.  There may be other factors, not addressed here, that enter into
any final determination that government action gives rise to liability under
the Clause.  The Essay is concerned only with whether the ability to deter-
mine the amount of just compensation is a limiting principle on the scope of
the constitutional right.
I. HOW TO DETERMINE JUST COMPENSATION
The Takings Clause is unique among constitutional provisions in that it
specifies a remedy for its violation: the payment of just compensation.  More-
over, by common consensus this is the exclusive remedy for violation of the
Clause.2  As the Supreme Court has observed, the Clause “is designed not to
© 2021 Thomas W. Merrill.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School.
1 The Takings Clause provides: “nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 This does not mean that anticipatory relief should be prohibited if it will serve to
speed the resolution of litigation. See Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings,
1421
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limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting
to a taking.”3  The question for consideration is whether this uniquely limited
remedy also limits the substantive protection afforded by the Clause.
The possibility of a compensation constraint gains force when one con-
siders that the approach to determining the measure of just compensation is
by far the most settled of the various issues that can arise under the Clause.
The reason for this is that most disputes governed by the Clause involve
express exercises in the taking of property under the power of eminent
domain.4  The primary contested issue in such cases is the amount of com-
pensation that is owed; as a result, the basic principles that govern the deter-
mination of just compensation have been repeatedly adjudicated by courts
over a significant period of time.
When one peruses the leading decisions on the meaning of just compen-
sation and the treatises on eminent domain like Nichols, one learns that the
general principle in all cases is that just compensation means fair market
value.5  Fair market value is further defined to mean what a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller in an arm’s-length transaction.6  This is obviously
an imputed number.  By definition, when the government takes property
there is no arm’s-length transaction: we are dealing with forced exchanges of
property, not voluntary exchanges.  The determination of fair market value
therefore is based on an imaginary transaction of the subject property, and
an estimate or guess about the price that would be agreed upon in such a
hypothetical transaction.
These generalities are further particularized by considering a number of
methods that are permissible to use in calculating fair market value.  The
method most commonly used is (1) to examine recent transactions of other
property similar to the property taken, making adjustments for differences in
the size, age, location, and the quality of improvements.  Other techniques
that have been used less often include (2) considering recent transactions of
the property in question, making adjustments for general changes in market
prices since the date of those transactions; (3) estimating the rental value of
the property in question, and capitalizing this to generate an imputed
purchase price using a rate of return commonly used as a benchmark for
128 HARV. L. REV. 1630 (2015) (arguing that declaratory relief should be available if condi-
tions warrant it).  But the final judgment in any case that successfully establishes that the
government engaged in a taking of property for public use will always be an award of just
compensation for the taking.
3 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
315 (1987).
4 Indeed, virtually all the reported cases that address the meaning of just compensa-
tion involve express takings.  A small number of decisions that involve regulatory takings
are referenced in Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 684–85 (2005).
5 4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.02[1], at 12–60 to 12–67
(3d ed. 2006).
6 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374–75 (1943).
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investments in similar property; and (4) estimating the replacement cost of
the property in question, making adjustments to reflect depreciation due to
age and wear and tear of the property in question.7
A critical point to make about the established methods of determining
fair market value is that each presupposes that the property in question is of
a type that is commonly exchanged in voluntary transactions.  This is most
obvious with respect to the first method—looking to comparable transac-
tions—which rests on the understanding that the property taken is similar to
other properties that have recently been exchanged for value.  But it is also
true of the other valuation techniques as well.  The previous transaction of
the subject property method presupposes that there has been at least one
recent voluntary transaction of the property in question; the capitalization of
rental value method presupposes that similar properties are leased and the
rents reflect voluntarily negotiated leases; and the replacement cost method
assumes that there is a market for the relevant inputs (typically land and
building materials) such as would be needed to create a replacement to the
property that has been taken.
To generalize, all methods of determining just compensation rest on
some variation of the understanding that compensation is measured by vol-
untary transactions for value involving property similar to the property taken.
One looks to the money that changes hands when similar property is volunta-
rily transferred, and this provides the benchmark that fixes the compensation
that must be paid when the government compels a transfer of property.  Just
compensation for forced exchange is fixed by drawing inferences from volun-
tary exchange.
II. SOME GENERAL IMPLICATIONS
Let us consider some implications of the general principle that just com-
pensation for takings is based on fair market value as determined by extrapo-
lating from the amount of money that changes hands in voluntary exchanges
of similar property.  If we take this principle as our Archimedean point of
departure, what if any conclusions can be drawn about other, more contested
aspects of the law that governs takings of property?
One very broad implication is that a constitutional right to just compen-
sation for takings of property makes sense only in a society in which voluntary
exchange is the norm and forced exchange is exceptional.  Imagine, for
example, a society that adopts a just compensation clause in which all facto-
ries but one are owned and operated by the state.  The government decides
to eliminate the anomaly by nationalizing the one factory in private hands.
7 DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 169–71 (2002); SACKMAN,
supra note 5, § 12.02[1], at 12–60 to 12–67; see also Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensa-
tion: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 616–17 (2013)
(listing methods 1, 3, and 4 (as enumerated here) as the three most used methods);
Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239, 252 &
n.46 (2007).
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How is just compensation for this taking going to be determined?  Clearly,
there will be no transactions in comparable properties that can be used to
estimate what just compensation will be for taking the one non-state-owned
factory.  Nor will there be a rental market for factory properties from which
one can derive a fair rental value and an appropriate rate of capitalization.
Conceivably, there will be a transaction involving the seized factory sometime
in the past, but this may have occurred long ago and in a different context
that gives the transaction little probative value.  Replacement cost is another
possibility, but unless all the inputs that would go into constructing a new
factory, including land and all the materials needed to build a factory, are
freely exchanged in competitive markets, the derivation of compensation
using the replacement cost method is not likely to work either.
So one very broad implication of starting from the principles of just com-
pensation is that protection against government takings can exist only in a
society that has a market economy.  One cannot have something like a tak-
ings clause in a hunter-gatherer society where there is no formal system of
exchange of goods.  Nor, to take the other extreme, does a takings clause
make sense in a thoroughgoing socialist economy where the government
controls all relevant resources.  The simple reason is that in such a system
there will be no way to calculate just compensation in return for forced
exchanges of resources.
Another important implication is that the Takings Clause cannot be
applied to entitlements that are not exchanged for value—bought and sold.
There are a variety of reasons why things are not bought and sold.
One reason is that they are too plenteous, under current conditions of
technology and levels of supply and demand, to generate any kind of
exchange of rights.8  Wind and sunlight might be examples.  Both are quite
useful, for example, in generating electricity.  They definitely have value.  But
at least under current technology and levels of supply and demand, there is
no market for transferring wind and sunlight from one landowner—who is
assumed to have the right to capture these resources when they enter the
column of space above the land—to other users.  This could change.  We are
beginning to see occasional nuisance suits complaining about neighbors cast-
ing shadows on nearby solar collectors or erecting windmills that diminish
the flow of air on nearby land.9  This could conceivably evolve into a general
practice of exchanging solar or wind easements for value, in which case the
8 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 717–18 (1986) (discussing the idea of “plenteous” goods as
an explanation for the absence of private rights).
9 See, e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982); Tenn v. 889 Assocs., Ltd., 500
A.2d 366 (N.H. 1985); Burch v. Nedpower Mount Storm, LLC, 647 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va.
2007).  The general rule is that casting a shadow on neighboring property is not actiona-
ble. See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959).  For recent disputes among landowners over “wind shadow” or “wind
wake” created by the construction of nearly wind turbines, see Yael R. Lifshitz, Rethinking
Original Ownership, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 513, 539–43 (2016).
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conditions for calculating just compensation for blocking sun or wind might
arise.  Or a system of government-created exchangeable wind rights or sun-
light rights might emerge.10  But as things currently stand, wind and sunlight
are regarded as “free goods” that can be captured by whoever controls the
column of space in which these resources happen to enter.  These resources
thus cannot be valued in monetary terms in such a way as would be required
in order to calculate just compensation for their taking.
Another reason things are not bought and sold is that they are regarded
as rights that belong to the public in general.  Prime examples would be navi-
gable waterways, public lands held in an open access status, and ideas and
images in the public domain.  Such resources are commonly protected
against private claiming, either by statute or under the nebulous public trust
doctrine.  Since private exclusion rights are prohibited, there is no basis for
buying and selling such public rights.  They are “not the ‘property’ right of
anyone—hence the sardonic maxim, explaining what economists call the
‘tragedy of the commons,’ res publica, res nullius.”11  To be sure, a proposal to
sell off public assets could be subject to valuation, if the hived-off assets are
subject to exclusion rights.12  But if the assets are indelibly impressed with an
open-access status, as was held in the leading public trust decision,13 no one
will bid for such rights.  There will, accordingly, be no basis for determining
their fair market value, and hence no basis for assimilating them to the obli-
gation to compensate for takings.
A third reason things are not bought and sold is that they have a nega-
tive value.  A prime example might be general liabilities.  By a general liabil-
ity I mean one that is payable from any source of funds, like a personal loan
or an income tax or inheritance tax.  Commentators have occasionally mused
about whether taxes should be regarded as takings of property, at least in
some circumstances.14  But general liabilities are not bought and sold.  The
right to receive payments based on general liabilities are bought and sold.  We
call this the bond market.  Bonds and other forms of assignable rights to
receive monies like securitized receivables are transacted all the time, and
valuing these instruments is easy.  So it is reasonable to assume that a govern-
ment seizure or cancellation of an assignable right to receive payments would
be regarded as a taking.15  But general obligations to pay someone else,
including obligations to pay taxes to the government, are not bought and
10 See generally Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier: Climate Change,
Natural Resource Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63 (2011).
11 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673
(1999) (footnote omitted).
12 See Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 421 (1987).
13 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1892).
14 See e.g., Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous Bur-
dens Principle, and Its Broader Application, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 189 (2002); Eduardo Moisés
Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182 (2004).
15 Thus, the Court has occasionally held that government interference with the right
to receive interest on a sum of money can be a taking. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found.,
524 U.S. 156, 163, 172 (1998); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155
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sold, since these obligations have only a negative value.16  Which suggests,
under the hypothesis being considered, that taxes cannot be takings, at least
when they take the form of general obligations like income or inheritance
taxes.
A fourth example might be things that clearly have value but which by
law cannot be assigned or transferred.  Many years ago, the Supreme Court
considered whether a delegated power of eminent domain given to a hydroe-
lectric company is an interest that should be compensated when the right is
eliminated.17  The right to condemn property is said to be a type of sovereign
authority, but it is often delegated to common carriers, utility companies,
and the like.  What one does not see, not in any legally sanctioned sense, is
the buying and selling of the right of eminent domain.  The Court held in
the referenced case that the delegated power of eminent domain is not sub-
ject to compensation for a taking.18  This seems correct, under the hypothe-
sis we are considering, given that there is no way to determine what the just
compensation should be for taking such a power.
One can generalize the point by saying that any type of nonassignable
government power, privilege, or license is not going to be regarded as some-
thing eligible for compensation if it is taken away.  A license to practice law
or medicine, a nontransferable liquor license, a certificate of public conve-
nience and necessity to operate a railroad or other common carrier or util-
ity—any of these permissions, if they cannot be assigned from one holder to
another, will not generate any information about what a willing buyer would
pay and a willing seller would accept in an arm’s-length transaction.  Conse-
quently, it will not be possible to determine what just compensation should
be given if they are cancelled or terminated by the government.  The hypoth-
esis under consideration therefore suggests that they will not be regarded as
giving rise to a right to compensation.19
A final example might be things that are given to particular persons for
reasons unique to that person.  Possible illustrations include personal awards
(a Pulitzer Prize), titles (a knighthood), powers (a power of appointment
under a will), invitations to join an honorific society (the National Academy
of Sciences), or even dinner invitations.  Such things can be cancelled or
rescinded, but it is not possible to imagine that they might be taken for just
(1980) (clerk of court takes interest on fund of money deposited in court in an inter-
pleader action).
16 See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539–40 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The Court distin-
guished Eastern Enterprises in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595
(2013), which involved a challenge to an exaction of money as a condition for permitting
development of a parcel of property.  The Court distinguished an exaction imposed as a
condition for developing an individual parcel from a tax, which it affirmed could not be
regarded as a taking.
17 United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 276–81 (1943).
18 Id.
19 For a discussion of the narrower category of things that cannot be sold but can be
gifted away, see infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
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compensation.  Given their personalized nature, they are never exchanged
for value.  And because they are never exchanged for value, there is no way to
determine how to measure just compensation if they are cancelled or
rescinded.
III. THE MEANING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
The reverse engineering exercise is therefore capable of generating
some general conclusions about the scope of the Takings Clause.  Of greater
doctrinal interest, it would seem that the compensation constraint also has
value in identifying what sorts of interests will qualify as “private property” for
purposes of the Clause.
In theory, “private property” could refer to well-established bundles of
rights, like the fee simple, the life estate, the lease, the trust, and so forth.  Or
it could refer to every incident associated with property, like the right to
exclude, the right to use, and the right to transfer.  When we start with the
compensation constraint, it would seem that private property must refer to
discrete assets that can be exchanged for consideration on a standalone
basis.20  Steven Eagle has called this the “commercial unit test,” meaning an
interest that is “actually recognized as traded in a market in the community
in which it is located.”21
The rationale for limiting private property for takings purposes to pack-
ages of rights that are “exchangeable on a standalone basis” or “tradeable in
the local market” follows directly from the requirement of determining just
compensation.  The measure of just compensation is market value, and mar-
ket value is obviously difficult if not impossible to determine when the gov-
ernment has taken an interest that is not bought and sold in the market.
Under other conceptions of the meaning of private property, such that it
refers to every incident in property, we would frequently be faced with claims
that the government has taken interests for which there is no market, creat-
ing a conundrum for how to determine just compensation.
Limiting the definition of private property to exchangeable rights also
fits well with longstanding practice associated with exercises of the power of
eminent domain.  All agree the Constitution requires compensation when
the government exercises the power of eminent domain.  The question then
becomes: When does the government see fit to exercise the power of emi-
nent domain?
The answer, which is abundantly clear from long experience, is that the
government resorts to eminent domain when it needs to acquire a configura-
tion of assets that is commonly tradeable or exchangeable in the market, but
which for one reason or another cannot be purchased by the government at
20 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 7, at 68–81; Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Consti-
tutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 974–78 (2000).
21 Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,
2007 BYU L. REV. 899, 941; see also STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS §§ 7-7(e)(5), 7-8
(5th ed. 2012).
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what would ordinarily be its market value.22  In other words, the government
would ordinarily purchase the configuration of assets, but finds it cannot do
so at a price that falls within what it regards as the range of existing market
prices.  Usually, this will be because the property enjoys some feature that
gives the existing owner the ability to hold out for a price in excess of what
would otherwise be its market value.23  Less commonly, it might be because
the government has an urgent need for the property that precludes going
through the process of ordinary negotiation of a sale.  In short, eminent
domain is used to acquire assets that are tradeable in the local market, or
exchangeable on a standalone basis, but which, for reasons particular to the
project in question, cannot be acquired at a price approximating normal
market value.24
The relatively small number of decisions that have considered the mean-
ing of private property for purposes of eminent domain are consistent with
this conclusion.  The Court has held that flowage easements, leases, trade
secrets, and security interests are all types of “private property” that require
the payment of just compensation if they are taken by the government or
transferred pursuant to forced exchange.25  All of these interests are
exchangeable on a standalone basis and are ordinarily acquired through
some kind of voluntary exchange of rights.  In contrast, the Court has held
that the head of water in rivers, a delegated power of eminent domain, future
social security benefits, prospective business customers, and freedom from
general liabilities are not “private property” for takings purposes.26  These
interests are all subject to significant contingencies, whether they be natural,
governmental, or commercial.  In any event, they are the kinds of interests
that are not transacted, at least not on a standalone basis, and consequently
would present very difficult challenges of valuation.
Even if “private property” is limited to exchangeable assets for purposes
of eminent domain, it does not inevitably follow that the same understanding
22 This is confirmed by the nearly universal practice, which is sometimes required by
law, of seeking to acquire the property by negotiation before resorting to eminent domain.
23 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61
(1986) (presenting a survey of eminent domain decisions showing that nearly all involve
acquiring assets with some kind of holdout power).
24 Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1340–41
(1991) (“The predictive rule for takings law . . . [is] that compensation will be required
when the intervention is readily seen as a substitute for a private purchase.”).
25 United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 631 (1961) (flowage ease-
ment); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 381–83 (1945) (lease); Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (trade secrets); United States v. Sec.
Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75–76 (1982) (security interests).
26 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 511 (1945) (head of water in
river); United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 276–81 (1943)
(delegated power of eminent domain); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608 (1960)
(future social security benefits); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672 (1999) (prospective customers); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498, 539–40 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part);
id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (immunity from liabilities).
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should prevail for regulatory takings purposes.  The regulatory takings doc-
trine has taken on a life of its own in recent decades, as a kind of stand-in for
the protections that used to be provided by the Contracts Clause or the doc-
trine of substantive due process.  More generally, the Supreme Court has
defined “property” differently for different constitutional purposes.27  For
instance “property” means something different for procedural due process
purposes than it does for substantive due process purposes, and something
different still for purposes of eminent domain.  Thus, it is conceivable that
“private property” might be defined one way for eminent domain purposes,
and a different way for regulatory takings purposes.
There is one insuperable barrier, however, to effectuating a divorce
between the definition of private property as it applies to explicit and implicit
takings.  The ultimate remedy for any kind of taking under the Constitution
is the payment of just compensation to the party who has suffered the taking.
Just compensation is determined, as we have seen, using a variety of valuation
techniques keyed to market values.  Thus, regulatory takings, like exercises of
eminent domain, must retain at least a significant nexus to a conception of
private property that takes the form of exchangeable assets.
One would predict, therefore, that regulatory takings claims, to the
extent they succeed, will be limited to government regulations that impair
the value of forms of property that are themselves tradeable or exchangeable
on a standalone basis.  Regulations of interests associated with real property
are an obvious example.  Regulations of interests associated with tangible
personal property would be another.  Regulations that apply to intangible
rights that are tradeable or exchangeable on a standalone basis, like security
interests or intellectual property rights, would be a third.
This is consistent with the observed pattern of cases.  By far the largest
number of regulatory takings cases involves regulatory restrictions on the use
of real property, such as those imposed by zoning restrictions or environmen-
tal laws.  Another cluster of cases concerns rent controls, again usually those
applied to leases of real property.
IV. THE MEANING OF TAKING
The most contested term in takings jurisprudence concerns what it
means to “take” private property.  This is not an issue in eminent domain
proceedings, where the government (or its delegate) explicitly asserts the
power to acquire an interest in private property through forced exchange.
This is unambiguously a “taking” of property.  The issue arises almost exclu-
sively in cases where the government denies it is taking any property, and
claims only to be regulating the use of property.  These cases by convention
are called “regulatory takings.”
By general consensus, the decisional law that seeks to specify what it
means for the government to “take” property, when its action falls short of
appropriating or destroying the property, is a mess.  The most frequently
27 See generally Merrill, supra note 20.
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quoted line, which comes from Justice Holmes’s opinion in the foundational
regulatory taking case, is that a taking occurs when the government “goes too
far” in regulating the use of property.28  The modern formulation favored by
the Court is that a “taking” is determined by applying a three-part test said to
have been laid down in 1978 in the Penn Central decision.29  The Court has
never clarified whether this is a balancing test, a list of three conditions any
one of which will qualify a regulation as a taking, or a list of three conditions,
the failure of any one of which will disqualify a regulation from being consid-
ered a taking.30  Lower courts, regulators, attorneys advising clients, and
commentators understandably bewail the uncertain state of the doctrine.
Perhaps further progress can be made by considering how the compen-
sation constraint limits the universe of potential regulatory takings cases.
The hypothesis generated by the reverse engineering exercise is that courts
will find that a restriction on the use of property is a regulatory taking only if
there is a feasible way of determining compensation for the lost value caused
by the restriction.  If determining compensation is not feasible using estab-
lished conventions for measuring compensation, there is no point in going
down the regulatory takings path in the first place.  In pursuing this implica-
tion of the compensation constraint, I will consider three possible bases for
concluding that a regulation of the use of property satisfies the compensa-
tion constraint, and thus is at least eligible for being characterized as a regu-
latory taking: the anticircumvention theory, the partial taking model, and the
public utility model.
A. The Anticircumvention Theory
One way to square the regulatory takings doctrine with the compensa-
tion constraint is to consider the doctrine as an anticircumvention device.
The idea here is that a regulatory taking occurs when the government seeks
to evade its responsibility to compensate for taking property by labeling what
would ordinarily be an exercise in eminent domain as a police power mea-
sure.31  This is a plausible interpretation of the Supreme Court’s first major
regulatory takings decision, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.32  It also finds
distinct echoes in more recent opinions, which describe the regulatory tak-
ings doctrine as seeking “to identify regulatory actions that are functionally
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates
private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”33
28 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
29 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
30 See Adam R. Pomeroy, Penn Central After 35 Years: A Three Part Balancing Test or a
One Strike Rule?, 22 FED. CIR. BAR J. 677 (2013).
31 See generally, Thomas W. Merrill, The Eagle Theory, 9 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J. 17
(2020) (attributing the theory to Steven Eagle and spelling out its strengths and weak-
nesses as a general theory of regulatory takings).
32 260 U.S. at 413 (“But obviously the [police power] limitation must have its limits, or
the contract and due process clauses are gone.”).
33 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
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The anticircumvention interpretation could be regarded as the exclusive
understanding of the regulatory takings doctrine.  More modestly, it could be
considered as a kind of safe harbor in understanding when a regulatory tak-
ing has occurred—a “categorical rule” to use the vocabulary generally used
in discussing different takings doctrines.  Either way, the idea would be that
when the government purportedly uses its police power to acquire an interest
in property that would ordinarily be acquired by eminent domain, the court
should declare the police measure a regulatory taking, or “inverse condem-
nation,” to use an older expression.  Eminent domain, as we have seen, is
ordinarily used to obtain by force a variety of interests that are commonly
acquired in the relevant market by voluntary exchange.  Under the anticir-
cumvention theory, it follows that an attempt by the government to use the
police power to obtain an interest in property that is commonly exchanged
on a standalone basis should be declared to be a taking for which the owner
is entitled to just compensation.
The Court’s Loretto decision, which involved the transfer of a utility ease-
ment to a cable TV company by operation of government regulation, is an
illustration of this approach.34  The Court held that the regulation was a tak-
ing of property,35 and properly so, given that utility easements are ordinarily
purchased or acquired through a delegated power of eminent domain.
Other decisions in which the Court has held regulations of property to be
categorical takings can similarly be explained on this basis.36
Although the anticircumvention theory will not appeal to the more
ardent friends of property rights, it has one signal virtue: it limits regulatory
takings to circumstances that satisfy the compensation constraint.  If the gov-
ernment is acquiring for public use an interest that is exchangeable on a
standalone basis, this means the interest acquired is amenable to valuation
using the established conventions associated with measuring just
compensation.
B. The Partial Takings Model
Another model that could be used to determine the measure of just
compensation for a regulatory taking would be based on the approach taken
in partial physical takings cases.37  Many, perhaps most, physical takings are
34 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
35 Id.
36 This would include decisions characterizing demands for the conveyance of a public
easement to be categorical takings, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987), as well as a decision characteriz-
ing the compelled transfer of interest on a fund deposited with a lawyer to a charitable
trust as a categorical taking, see Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003).
In each case, the government by regulation was seeking to compel the transfer of an inter-
est in property that is exchangeable on a standalone basis.
37 This Section and the next draw in part on Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensa-
tion for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 110, 121–26 (2002).
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partial takings.38  That is, the condemning authority acquires only a portion
of the owner’s property and leaves the rest in the owner’s hands.  This will
commonly occur, for example, when the taking is for a highway or a utility
easement.  Regulatory takings can be said to be a type of partial taking, in the
sense that the regulation reduces the uses of the property, but leaves other
aspects of the property untouched, if only because the owner remains in pos-
session.  Hence, we could attempt to derive the measure of compensation in
regulatory takings cases by looking to the decisional law that deals with the
measure of compensation for partial physical takings of property.
The rules for computing fair market value in partial takings cases differ
in important respects from those that apply in total takings cases.  Most nota-
bly, in partial takings cases the owner is compensated not only for the fair
market value of the part that is taken, but also for the loss in value of the part
that is not taken.  These losses in value are typically called “severance dam-
ages.”39  Thus, for example, if the government condemns a 200-foot strip of
land across an owner’s land for a highway, the owner is entitled to the fair
market value of the 200-foot strip of land.  In addition, if construction of the
highway reduces the value of the remaining land—perhaps because it makes
access to the remaining land more difficult—the owner is also entitled to
severance damages reflecting the reduced market value of the land not
taken.
Most jurisdictions, including the federal government, also permit the
court in partial physical takings cases to take into account offsetting benefits
that may have increased the market value of the portion of the property not
taken.40  To continue with the highway example, if the taking of the 200-foot
strip for a highway increases the market value of the remaining land—per-
haps because the remaining land is now valuable for use as a strip mall rather
than for residential or agricultural purposes—then the court will subtract the
higher value of the remaining land from the compensation that is owed the
owner for the land taken.  In theory, offsetting benefits can reduce the
amount of compensation in partial takings cases to zero (although it appears
the government never seeks restitution if the project results in a net gain to
the owner).
The practice of reducing compensation for offsetting benefits can give
rise to certain problems of horizontal equity if the project creates costs or
benefits for owners who experience no physical taking as well as those who
do.  For example, suppose the new highway increases the market value of
land a block lot away from the new highway, as well as the land that is subject
to condemnation of the 200-foot strip.  If the offsetting benefits rule allows
the compensation to the owner whose land is partially taken to be reduced to
zero, this owner will have suffered a loss of 200 feet of land with no compen-
38 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Partial Takings, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
2043, 2049 (2017).
39 4A SACKMAN, supra note 5, § 14A.03[1], at 14A–41 n.3.
40 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 557 (1897); 4A SACKMAN, supra note 5, § 14A.01[2],
at 14A–4.
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sation, whereas the owner one block away will have received a benefit in
terms of higher property values but will have lost no land at all.  To account
for this perceived inequity, many jurisdictions have adopted a distinction
between “general” and “special” benefits.  If the benefit is general—that is, if
it affects persons whose property is not partially taken as well as those whose
property is partially taken—then no offset is permitted.  If the benefit is spe-
cial, in the sense that it affects only those whose property is partially taken,
then an offset is permitted.41
The distinction between general and special benefits is often difficult to
apply, and so other jurisdictions have abandoned the distinction and instead
apply a simple before-and-after test.42  Under this approach, in the event of a
partial taking, two determinations of fair market value are made: one for the
total value of the property before the partial taking, and a second for the
total value of the property after the partial taking.  This is thought to capture
both severance damages and offsetting benefits in one before-and-after com-
parison.43  If the pre-taking value is higher than the post-taking value, the
owner is entitled to the difference as just compensation.  If the difference is
zero, or the post-taking value is higher than the pre-taking value, the owner
gets no compensation.
This before-and-after valuation approach could be adopted for use in
determining just compensation in regulatory takings cases.  In effect, the
court would take a snapshot of fair market value before the imposition of a
burdensome regulation, and a snapshot of the value after the imposition of
the regulation.  The difference in fair market value would, in effect,
represent the capitalized (negative) value of the regulatory restriction.  This
approach would obviously account for any benefits to the property conferred
by the regulation, as well as the costs.
The partial takings analogy reveals that it is theoretically possible to
determine just compensation in regulatory takings cases, at least when the
regulation applies to a unit of property that is commonly exchanged on a
standalone basis in market transactions.44  Nevertheless, it also underscores
that the compensation constraint imposes some potentially significant limita-
tions on the regulatory takings doctrine.
One interesting limitation concerns regulations that prohibit any sale or
exchange for consideration of certain types of property.  For example, in
Andrus v. Allard, the Court considered a statute and regulations that prohib-
ited any sale of eagle feathers or of any object containing eagle feathers, but
41 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 38, at 2056 –57.
42 See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d. 524, 527 (N.J. 2013).
43 Of course, it will be necessary to exclude changes in value due to other factors
besides the adoption of the regulation, which may be difficult.
44 This appears to be the approach implicitly adopted by the Court in Brown v. Legal
Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 235–36 (2003), which concluded that zero compen-
sation was owed because the value was zero before the regulation was imposed and zero
afterwards.
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did not bar gifts or inheritance of such objects.45  The Court rejected a regu-
latory takings challenge to the measure without giving any consideration to
how compensation could be measured.  But the prohibition on any sale or
exchange for value would obviously make any calculation of lost value impos-
sible under a before-and-after approach patterned on the partial physical tak-
ings model.  One could presumably gather evidence of market value before
the prohibition took effect.  But any transaction afterward would be illegal,
which would make any determination of market value difficult if not impossi-
ble to establish and verify.  This, standing alone, should be sufficient reason
to reject a regulatory takings claim.  The Court relied in part on Prohibition-
era decisions rejecting similar claims with respect to stocks of liquor pro-
duced before sales were made illegal.46  Again, these decisions did not rest
on the compensation constraint, but the difficulty of doing a before-and-after
valuation when sales are rendered illegal would seem to be a sufficient reason
to reject a regulatory taking claim for any statute that renders certain goods
inalienable for consideration.
Another possible implication of the partial takings model is that it will be
difficult to establish that a regulation has reduced the value of property if the
regulation generally applies to all similarly situated property.  For example, if
a zoning ordinance is passed that prohibits any construction in the commu-
nity above a certain height, it will be difficult to establish that any decline in
market value for a particular lot in the community is due to the regulation.
With a more targeted regulation, the inference of causation is more plausible
(although even with a targeted regulation there may be difficult questions of
causation).  But if all otherwise similar properties are equally restricted, any
decline in value after the regulation is adopted may be purely coincidental.
The problem of causal attribution raises a more general concern about
relying on any before-and-after measure of valuation to establish a regulatory
taking.  In this regard, it is significant that the rules for determining compen-
sation for partial physical takings apply only to owners who have suffered
some physical appropriation of a portion of their property.  They do not apply to
owners who have not had any of their property physically taken.  Thus, to
return again to the highway example, if the new highway generates noise and
congestion in the area, such that owners of land one block away suffer a loss
in the market value of their land, this is universally regarded a damnum absque
injuria—a noncompensable loss.  Courts have consistently rejected the idea
that the government has some general obligation to compensate owners for
the adverse effects of government projects that affect the value of their prop-
erty but do not physically touch the property.47
45 444 U.S. 51, 55–56 (1979).
46 Id. at 67 (first citing James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924); and
then citing Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920)); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887).
47 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943) (“As respects other property of the
owner consisting of separate tracts adjoining that affected by the taking, the Constitution
has never been construed as requiring payment of consequential damages . . . .”).
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The historical reluctance of courts to award any compensation to owners
who have suffered a decline in the market value of their property, without
more, casts light on the failure of courts to implement the idea that regula-
tory takings can be identified by some measure of “diminution in value”
standing alone.48  The Court has singled out for categorical treatment the
limiting case where the regulation reduces the market value of the property
to zero.49  But such cases are rare.  And the courts have been unable to iden-
tify any threshold below 100% as the line at which a regulatory taking should
be found.  Such a threshold has been established by legislation in some
states, but the experience with these statutory protections has been unhappy
for various reasons, often leading to their repeal or significant modifica-
tion.50  This does not mean that a better designed statute could not succeed.
But it suggests that courts are unlikely to develop a body of judge-made rules
that define regulatory takings in terms of a before-and-after measure of
reduction in market value standing alone.
C. The Public Utility Model
A third model that could be adopted for determining just compensation
in regulatory takings cases is the approach followed in public utility cases.  It
has long been established that the rates charged by public utilities are subject
to review under the Takings Clause.51  The public utility cases present a situa-
tion analogous to regulatory takings, in that the government has not taken
title to property nor has it physically appropriated any physical assets.
Instead, the government has regulated the property in a way that restricts the
freedom of the owner to determine the price or level of services associated
with its use, thereby impairing the value of the property.
In the public utility cases, a variation on the fair market value standard is
used—the fair return on investment standard.  The fair return standard
operates in a manner similar to the fair market value standard.  The objective
is to determine just compensation based on benchmarks that reflect the
behavior of other actors in the relevant market.  One key understanding is
that the regulated firm is entitled to recover only the reasonable costs of
providing the service in question.  It is assumed that, if the firm were operat-
ing in a competitive environment, it would be able to recover from consum-
ers only reasonable costs; any attempt to charge more would result in a loss of
business to competitors.  Another key understanding is that the regulated
48 For the Supreme Court’s wandering pronouncements, see Thomas W. Merrill, The
Supreme Court’s Regulatory Takings Doctrine and the Perils of Common Law Constitutionalism, 34 J.
LAND USE & ENV’T L. 1, 8–26 (2018).
49 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).  The Court added the
qualification that even in a total wipeout case, the regulation will not be regarded as a
taking if it tracks the result that would be obtained under the common law of nuisance.  Id.
50 See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evidence from the
Oregon Experiment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (2009).
51 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 497 (2002); Duquesne Light Co. v.
Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 305 (1989).
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firm is entitled to recover a rate of return on investment comparable to the
return that investors expect to receive when committing funds to investments
of comparable risk.  In a competitive market, the firm would be able to
attract investment capital only if it were able to provide a return at least as
high as investors require before committing funds to other investments of
similar risk.
These inquiries entail considerable complexity.  At least with respect to
public utility companies, the complexity of determining reasonable costs and
a fair return on investment means that these inquiries have been given over
to specialized administrative bodies.  In practice, courts give these bodies
broad discretion in determining what constitutes reasonable cost and a fair
return on investment.  For example, the Supreme Court has said that regula-
tors are free to value investment property using either an original cost or
replacement cost method.52  The Court has also permitted regulators to
impose rates on certain services below cost, so long as the total effect of the
rate order permits a fair return on investment.53  The constitutional standard
nevertheless lurks in the background and has played an important role in
structuring the inquiry in public utility rate cases.
In theory, the approach followed in the public utility cases could also be
applied to regulatory takings issues, such as those presented by land use and
environmental controls.  The general task of the court would be to develop a
model of what an otherwise identical firm would incur in the way of costs and
would require in terms of a return on investment in a competitive environ-
ment.  If the impact of the regulation is to drive the return on investment
below the benchmark rate of return, the government, as in the public utility
cases, would be required to provide compensation to close the gap.  The
amount of compensation, as under the partial takings model, should in the-
ory represent the capitalized (negative) value of the regulatory restriction.
There are reasons to question the practicality of the public utility model
as a basis for determining just compensation with respect to most run-of-the-
mill regulatory takings cases, such as those that arise out of zoning and other
land use restrictions.  One is the great complexity of the public utility model,
which at the very least would require extensive expert testimony on the part
of the claimant and, presumably, the regulatory authority.  This would inevi-
tably be expensive, and the expense may discourage courts from going down
this route.  Another is that the public utility model has fallen into disuse in
recent years in the sphere of its original application.  In part this is due to
persistently low inflation and interest rates, as these conditions tend to mute
controversy over utility rates.  In part, it is due to the emergence of genuine
or induced competition in many markets formerly served by natural monop-
52 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 539.
53 See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 312; Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 146,
148 (1953).
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oly utilities, which has displaced the need for traditional rate-of-return
ratemaking.54
More serious, perhaps, is the legal theory that justifies the application of
the Takings Clause to public utility rate regulation in the first place.
Although the courts have not made this entirely clear, it would seem that the
justification for applying the Takings Clause in this context is that the state
has compelled the utility to dedicate its property to the provision of public
service within a defined territory.55  In effect, the state has appropriated the
property to a public use, and therefore has a legal obligation to provide just
compensation.  If this is indeed the underlying theoretical justification, then
it is a condition precedent to invoking the public utility model that the prop-
erty owner cannot exit from the market it currently serves.  Some property
owners may be able to make such a claim; for example, owners of apartment
complexes subject to rent controls who are not allowed to convert their
apartments to condominiums.  But others will not be able to mount any such
showing.  Grape growers who do not like government limitations on the
quantity of grapes that can be sold in the raisin market can divert their crop
to the production of bulk wine.56  Thus, the public utility model may be of
limited use outside the context of class actions challenging draconian rent
control regimes and similar sorts of claims.
D. The Penn Central Case
The facts of the Court’s leading decision on regulatory takings—the
Penn Central case—can be used to illustrate how considerations about the
ability to determine just compensation might enter into resolving a difficult
case raising regulatory takings claims.57  In the case, the City of New York
imposed a historic preservation order on the Grand Central Terminal in
Manhattan, then owned by the Penn Central Railroad.  The Landmarks Pres-
ervation Commission denied two proposals by the owner to use the air rights
above the original terminal building for development by a third party.
Although there was some uncertainty about whether a further proposal
might eventually be approved, the company claimed that the preservation
order and its implementation constituted a regulatory taking of its air rights.
Assuming the preservation ordinance and its interpretation constituted
an indefinite prohibition of any construction in the portion of the air rights
54 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Indus-
tries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1408 (1998).
55 See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 517 (1944) (indicating that the Takings
Clause does not apply to price controls when the owner is legally free to exit the market).
A more realistic justification would be that the owner has invested in specific assets that
cannot be redeployed to alternative uses. See Thomas W. Merrill, Constitutional Limits on
Physician Price Controls, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 635, 640, 643–50 (1994).
56 But see Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 365 (2015) (summarily rejecting “let
them sell wine” as a defense to an action for physical appropriation of a portion of a raisin
crop).
57 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978).
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eligible for development, the first question would be whether such air rights
are commonly bought and sold in Manhattan in standalone transactions with
third parties.  It does not appear that any record evidence was developed on
this point and presented to the Court.58  We know that such transactions
occasionally occur in dense urban markets.59  If evidence had been
presented that such transactions occur in Manhattan, the preservation order
could be regarded as a regulatory taking under the anticircumvention the-
ory.  The City was attempting to acquire by regulation an interest that is ordi-
narily exchanged on a standalone basis by voluntary transactions.  Just
compensation should be capable of being determined by considering compa-
rable sales of air rights in the relevant area.
Another approach to the controversy, which is closer to the line of attack
developed by the company and adopted by the dissent, would be to challenge
the preservation ordinance as a form of impermissible spot zoning.60  Assum-
ing this line of attack had succeeded, it should not be barred by any concern
about the valuation constraint.  The historic preservation order was targeted
to this one parcel of property and did not apply to other properties in the
area.  Thus a before-and-after measure of market value, modeled on the par-
tial physical takings cases, could be used to develop the quantum of compen-
sation necessary to make the company whole for the effect of the regulation.
A third characterization of the preservation order, which was explored
in the lower courts and appears obliquely in the Supreme Court’s opinion, is
that it deprived the Penn Central Company of a fair return on its investment
in the terminal.61  The Penn Central Railroad was of course a common car-
rier, subject to regulation as such, and it was presumably required by law to
continue to operate the Grand Central Station as a terminal unless and until
it was given permission to abandon the facility.  Thus, the principles of the
public utility cases, which have long applied to railroads, would seem to be
applicable.  Whether compensation would be awarded to the carrier under
these principles was nevertheless highly uncertain, as the Court intuited.
The railroad was teetering on bankruptcy, but its financial problems had
complex roots that went well beyond the inability to capitalize on the air
rights above the terminal.  The public utility cases allow regulators to require
58 Penn Central’s contentions in this regard focused on whether certain “transfer
development rights” (TDRs), which allowed the company to develop above applicable zon-
ing height restrictions on nearby property, could be regarded as adequate compensation
for the alleged taking. See id. at 129; id. at 150–52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59 See JOSEPH D. KEARNEY & THOMAS W. MERRILL, LAKEFRONT: PUBLIC TRUST AND PRI-
VATE RIGHTS IN CHICAGO 235 (2021) (describing the transfer of air rights above the Illinois
Central Railroad terminal in Chicago for construction of the Prudential Financial, Inc.
building).  It also appears that such transfers were familiar in New York City. See generally
Note, Conveyance and Taxation of Air Rights, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1964); Note, Develop-
ment Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972).
60 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 132; id. at 146–47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 136 (majority opinion) (concluding that the ordinance did not deprive the
company of a fair return on its investment); id. at 129 (treating the company as having
conceded the point).
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companies to operate some functions at a loss, provided adequate revenues
are available to allow an adequate return on total firmwide investment.62
The question whether the railroad was denied just compensation by the pres-
ervation order would thus have to be resolved, at least initially, by a regula-
tory body with more general authority over the finances of the carrier,
presumably the Interstate Commerce Commission.  The New York state
courts, where Penn Central filed its takings claim, could not make the rele-
vant determination about just compensation under the public utility model.
Penn Central thus reveals that any one of the three alternatives to devel-
oping a market-based measure of compensation might have been available in
the case, had the litigation been framed in such a way to develop an adequate
record supporting the claim for a regulatory taking.
CONCLUSION
This Essay argues that the established nature of the relief available for a
taking of property—the payment of just compensation as measured by mar-
ket value—operates as a constraint on the scope of the Takings Clause,
including the universe of interests that are regarded as “private property”
and the circumstances that justify a finding that the government has “taken”
such property.  In this respect, the argument is a version of the more general
claim that limits on formulating appropriate remedies can shed important
light on the judicial understanding of nature and scope of constitutional
rights.63  The most general point of the Essay is that any right that is reme-
died by the payment of compensation based on market value will make sense
only so long as market exchange remains the norm and compulsory
exchange the exception.  If the realm of government-administered pricing
grows, the scope of operation for the Takings Clause will inevitably recede.
This is not an argument in favor of markets and against government-adminis-
tered prices.  It is merely a positive prediction about the expected domain of
the Takings Clause.
62 See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
63 See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
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